The Expanding Responsibility of the Government Air Traffic Controller by Levy, Stanley J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 36 Issue 3 Article 2 
1968 
The Expanding Responsibility of the Government Air Traffic 
Controller 
Stanley J. Levy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley J. Levy, The Expanding Responsibility of the Government Air Traffic Controller, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 
401 (1968). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol36/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Expanding Responsibility of the Government Air Traffic Controller 
Cover Page Footnote 
Member of the New York and Federal Bars. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol36/iss3/2 
THE EXPANDING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
GOVERNMENT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER
STANLEY J. LEVY*
I. INTRODUCTIONT WO mid-air collisions in 1967 involving commercial jetliners focused
public attention on the role of the United States in promoting avia-
tion safety.1 The Government's influence is felt in all phases of aviation
from certifying aircraft airworthiness, to providing funds and establish-
ing standards for airport development, to operating a multi-billion dollar
air traffic control system. Almost every flight made in the United States
is controlled to some degree by the Government's air traffic controllers
who provide instructions, information, advice and guidance to pilots fly-
ing the planes. Despite some initial reluctance, the courts have recognized
the extent and significance of the controller's role and have imposed an
affirmative duty on the controllers to take reasonable action to prevent
accidents. This is consistent with the reliance which users of airways
place upon the Government and with the Government's responsibility to
establish and foster maximum aviation safety.
Civil aviation has grown dynamically since the introduction of the jets
in 1955. Planes now fly at speeds in excess of 500 miles per hour and
within the next five years will be flying at two and three times the speed
of sound.' More significantly, the number of planes flying has increased
many fold to the point where our skies, particularly around major ter-
minal areas, are severely overcrowded and in danger of becoming satu-
rated.3 There has been a significant growth in the number of private
* Member of New York and Federal Bars.
1. In 1967, there were two major mid-air collisions involving commercial jets and pri-
vate business planes which were both being "controlled" by Government air traffic control-
lers. In March, a Trans World Airlines DC-9 crashed near Urbana, Ohio killing 26 persons,
and in June, a Piedmont Airlines Boeing 727 crashed near Ashville, North Carolina killing
82 persons.
2. The supersonic transports or SSTs are scheduled to be in commercial operation in
the early 1970s. The American SST, Boeing's 2707, will carry 292 persons, fly at 1,800 mph
and be operational by 1974. The British-French Concorde will carry 136 people, fly at
1,450 mph and be operational in 1971.
3. The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics reported that general aviation oper-
ations, which includes all civil aviation other than air carrier operation, increased from
8 million in 1954 to 26 million in 1965, a 2259 increase and is forecast to increase another
210% to 55 million by 1977. Commercial operators increased their operations from 5. to
7.8 million between 1954 and 1965 and a 218% increase to 17 million is forecast for 1977.
Report No. DO-136, "Long Range Planning for the Air Traffic Control System" 11
(Mar. 17, 1967).
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"week-end" pilots.4 The combination of a greater number of relatively
inexperienced pilots and an increased number of high performance planes
has increased the dangers of flying and placed the traffic controller in
a position of increased responsibility vis-h-vis the pilot.
The early rule, formulated before the advent of high speed aircraft,
limited the traffic controller's duty to advising aircraft operating in re-
stricted visibility conditions of ground based objects or other aircraft
which the controller knew or reasonably should have known constituted
a collision hazard." The courts accepted the premise formulated by the
Federal Aviation Agency and its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration, that the pilot was primarily, if not solely, responsible for
the safe operation of the plane, and the controller served simply as an
aide, providing some advice or assistance." However, judicial revaluation
quickly demonstrated that the rule was inflexible and did not reflect the
controller's responsibilities or satisfy the needs of the public or the
aviation industry.
There has been increasing judicial recognition that aviation safety re-
quires the combined efforts of both the pilots and the controllers. The
courts reasoned that aviation safety was more likely to be achieved by
imposing concurrent duties and responsibilities on both the pilot and the
controller.7 The courts have also recognized that the public, the airlines
and the pilots place a high degree of reliance upon the Government con-
trollers. In Ingham v. United States,8 Judge Kaufman, speaking for a
unanimous court, stated:
Our conclusion that the change in visibility should have been reported is in tune
with the heavy degree of reliance which passengers place upon the government for in-
suring the safety of their flights.... Much of the success in preventing such [aviation
accident] disasters can be attributed to the federal government's assumption of the
4. In fiscal 1965 the Federal Avation Agency, now the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), issued 132,608 airman certificates. In 1966, this was exceeded by 23% as the FAA
granted licenses to 166,940 pilots. FAA Ann. Rep., Fiscal Year 1966, at 3.
5. See Marino v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (where liablilty was
imposed); Schultetus v. United States, 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828
(1960) (where liability was denied).
6. Part 60 of the Civil Air Regulations (14 C.F.R. 60) in effect during 1955-63 stated:
"§ 60.2 The pilot in command of the aircraft shall be directly responsible for its operation
and shall have final authority as to operation of the aircraft. . ." When the CAR's were
changed over to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), § 60.2 was carried over as
F.A.R. 91.3. A footnote to § 60.21-1 provided in part: "It is the direct responsibility of
the pilot to avoid other aircraft when flying in VFR conditions even with a traffic clear-
ance."
7. Miller v. United States, 303 F.2d 703, 711 (9th Cir. 1962); Maryland ex rel. Meyer
v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966).
8. Ingham v. United States, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
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supervision of commercial flying; and public confidence in air travel has been fostered
in large measure by knowledge that our government, recognizing the high stakes in-
volved, is constantly overseeing the carrier's operations in order to promote safety.9
There is no longer a serious question of whether the controller has a
duty to exercise due care in assisting pilots; the question is the extent
and scope of that duty. A review of the legislative and judicial history
will help place the current re-examination of the Government's role in
proper context and suggest the extent to which the courts are likely to
expand the controller's duties in the three most common situations in-
volving alleged controller negligence: mid-air collisions and near misses,
vortex turbulence and weather reporting.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM
The air traffic control system has been unable to keep pace with the
dynamic expansion of aviation. This has been due in large part to the
failure of the Congress and the administration to provide sufficient money
for the hiring of personnel and the development and purchase of new
equipment. Money for air traffic control has been scarce except following
public outcry resulting from one or a series of major accidents. Conse-
quently, the technological innovations necessary to keep pace with the
expanded number of aircraft capable of travelling at high speed have
been delayed and adequate staffing has seldom been possible. The history
of the system has invariably been that progress has followed disaster.
Prior to 1940, most airport traffic control towers were operated pri-
vately or by municipalities with the federal government issuing certificates
to tower operators and suggesting standardized procedures. In 1936, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) began operating some enroute
airway facilities, and, in 1941, the CAA was given authority to operate a
number of control towers. 10 Gradually, the CAA assumed control of all
enroute traffic control facilities and almost all airport towers.
9. Id. at 235-36. The Court went on to state: "The carriers, relying on the FAA to
keep their pilots informed of current weather conditions, would be likely to reduce both
the quantity and quality of their own weather reporting. In light of this reliance, it is
essential that the government properly perform those services it has undertaken to provide
albeit voluntarily and gratuitously." Id. at 236.
10. Air traffic control was originally the responsibility of the Civil Aeronautics Admin-
istration (CAA) created by enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973,
49 U.S.C. § 401. The 1938 act was superseded by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
72 Stat. 737, 49 US.C. § 1301, which abolished the CAA and transferred its duties
and personnel to a newly established independent agency, the FAA. In 1967, the FAA
lost its independent status and was transferred as an entity to the newly established
Department of Transportation (DOT) as one of a number of administrations within DOT.
80 Stat. 931, 938 (1967).
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In 1956 and 1957, two mid-air collisions focused attention on the air
traffic control system and highlighted the inadequacy of the CAA. 11
Legislation was drafted; however, it took two more mid-air collisions in
195812 to create the public clamor which resulted in the passage of the
Federal Aviation Act of 195811 and the establishment of the independent
Federal Aviation Agency with an expanded mandate for aviation safety.
One of the main purposes of the new legislation was to improve the man-
agement of civilian and military air traffic and to expand and modernize
the traffic control system. Under the Act, the FAA Administrator was re-
quired to consider "the development and safety" of air commerce; 14
to provide for the use of the airspace "under such terms, conditions, and
limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of
aircraft... ; "s "to operate and maintain ... air-navigation facilities..."
and "provide necessary facilities and personnel for the regulation and
protection of air traffic . . . within the limits of available appropria-
tions; " 6 and to prescribe air traffic rules governing aircraft flight and for
the protection of aircraft."
In addition to creating an independent agency to operate and admin-
ister the air traffic control system, between 1958 and 1965 the nation
committed billions of dollars to aviation safety. The funds were used for
expanded research and development, to obtain modern radar and other
traffic control equipment, to build new facilities and to employ thousands
of new controllers. By the end of 1964 over half a billion dollars had been
spent for equipment which had a replacement value of $1,150,000,000,'"
and by 1967 the FAA was operating 28 Air Route Traffic Control Centers
(ARTCC), 305 control towers and 330 flight service stations (FSS) and
combined station towers,"0 and employed 17,000 air traffic controllers and
a total staff of over 43,914 people. 0 This massive commitment by the
11. On June 30, 1956, a United Air Lines DC-7 and TWA Super Constellation crashed
over the Grand Canyon and 128 persons died. On January 1, 1957, a DC-7 and a military
jet crashed over Los Angeles, the wreckage fell into a school yard killing two children.
12. On April 21, 1958, a United DC-7 collided with a military jet over Las Vegas and
48 persons died. On May 20, 1958, a Capital Airways Viscount collided with a military
jet over Brunswick, Maryland and 13 persons died.
13. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964).
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1964).
15. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1964).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(b) (1964).
17. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1964).
18. FAA Sixth Ann. Rep., Fiscal Year 1965, at 33.
19. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
20. FAA Sixth Ann. Rep., Fiscal Year 1964, at 106, 110.
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federal government has not gone unnoticed by the public, the users of
the airways or the courts.21
However, by 1965 the economy wave had again reached the FAA and
its appropriations were cut substantially. This in turn led to a slowdown
in equipment acquisition and to a freeze on the hiring of additional con-
trollers, forcing the controllers to work overtime and to handle more air-
craft than is considered advisable. 2 Following this cutback in funds, the
number of mid-air crashes" and "near misses"2'4  began rising again.
Following the second major mid-air disaster in 1967, congressional hear-
ings were conducted and in response to the public clamor and congres-
sional urging the administration has stated that more funds will be
available for air traffic control activities, however, no additional money
has as yet been appropriated.
The claims against the Government based on traffic controller negli-
gence have increased significantly. The Government is a defendant in
most near miss and mid-air crash cases"- and in many cases involving
marginal weather operations and wake or vortex turbulence.20 Its future
involvement and exposure is likely to increase. Therefore, it is increas-
ingly important to define the scope of the controllers' duties.
21. Ingham v. United States, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
22. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1967, at 1, col S.
23. On December 16, 1961, a United Air Lines DC-8 and a TWA super constellation
collided over New York City, and 128 persons aboard the planes and 8 persons on the
ground died. Following a period of years without a major mid-air disaster, they have
occurred with some frequency since 1964. In December, 1964, an Eastern Air Lines shuttle
collided with a TWA jet over Carmel, New York. Fortunately, the TWA plane wvas able
to reach Kennedy Airport and the Eastern plane made a partially controlled landing. On
February 8, 1965, an Eastern DC-7 departing Kennedy Airport crashed off Jones Beach
while taking evasive action to avoid a Pan Am jet approaching the airport. In 1967, there
were the two major crashes mentioned in note 1.
24. The Federal Aviation Agency reported 463 near misses in 1966, and 25 mid-air
collisions between general aviation aircraft. The actual figure is probably significantly
higher since most incidents are not reported because pilots fear punitive actions which
may be imposed. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1967, at 23, col. 6.
25. The Government has been sued along with the airline in the mid-air collisions in-
volving the crashes over the Grand Canyon, Las Vegas, Brunswick, Md., Brooklyn, New
York, Carmel, New York and the near miss case over Jones Beach. It will probably be
named as a party in both 1967 mid-air crashes.
26. In 1967, the FAA reported that 56 cases had been closed and 172 new cases begun,
representing a 20% increase in litigation. It further reported that the amount claimed in
damages increased from $171,160,000 to $207,817,262 and that "the main issue in these air-
craft accident cases is responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft-FAA's responsi-
bility in operating the air traffic control system vis-&-vis that of the pilot flying the air-
craft." FAA Eighth Ann. Rep., Fiscal Year 1966, at 104.
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III. THE RIGHT To SUE THE GOVERNMENT
The threshold issue in air traffic control liability cases is whether an
action can be maintained under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) .21
The Government has claimed immunity from tort liability based on
various "exceptions" or defenses set out in the FTCA. The Government
has asserted that the controllers' actions are purely governmental in
function and not the type performed by a private party; 28 that controllers
exercise judgment and the "discretionary function" exception bars re-
covery; 29 that in providing advice and instructions a representation is
involved and the "misrepresentation" exception is applicable;" ° and that
the "execution of . . . a regulation" provision bars suit where the con-
trollers were complying with the agency's interpretation of its own man-
ual provisions."' Each of these alleged defenses has been rejected.
The leading case on the issue of the Government's liability for the
negligent operation of the air traffic control system is Union Trust Co. v.
United States,2 where the court rejected the Government's claim that
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides that "ETlhe District Court . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal Injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 provides that
"The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for Interest prior to
judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2680 provides, "Exceptions. The provisions
of this chapter and § 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-(a) Any claim based upon
an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.
"(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with
contract rights." Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964). Procedures for controllers were originally set forth In
Army-Navy-Air Force-FAA "Procedures for Control of Air Traffic (ANC/PCAT) Manual
V." They now appear in the FAA "Air Traffic Control Manual, ATP 7110.1b, Facility
Operations Manual, ATP 7230.1B and Aeronautical Communications and Service Manual."
ATP 7300.1.
32. 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953). The jury returned a verdict against Eastern but
exonerated the Bolivian pilot and the District Judge held the Government liable. The
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both the "discretionary function" exception and the "private party" ar-
gument relieved it of responsibility for its controller's negligence. An
Eastern Air Lines DC-4 and a Bolivian government military aircraft
collided in mid-air while attempting to land at the Washington National
Airport. The United States was sued for the negligence of the controller in
clearing both aircraft to land on the same runway at the same time. The
Government claimed that its controller performed an essentially govern-
mental function, regulatory in nature and not analogous to functions per-
formed by a "private party" and that his actions involved the exercise
of discretion of a public character. The court traced the history of air
traffic control in the United States and concluded that "when the United
States entered the business of operating a civil airport and an air traffic
control tower in connection therewith, it assumed a role which might be
and was assumed by private interests.133 Therefore, the court stated that
unless some other provision of the FTCA barred recovery, "the govern-
ment is liable for the negligent acts or omissions of its control tower
operators in the performance of their functions and duties .... ""
The court went on to rule that even though the controllers might be
exercising some judgment in the course of controlling planes the discre-
tionary function exception was inapplicable to them. It cited Dalchite v.
United States35 to show that the Tort Claims Act would not bar suit for
negligence of government employees at the "operational level" where
there is no room for policy judgment and decision. It found that even if
the controller was "exercising discretion [in handling aircraft, he was]
not performing the sort of discretionary functions contemplated by sec-
tion 2680(a) and clearly described in the Dalehite decision."30 The court
concluded that the controller handled merely operational details and went
on to state that "discretion was exercised when it was decided to operate
the tower, but the tower personnel had no discretion to operate it
negligently."3 7
court of appeals, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), affirmed the judgment against the United
States but reversed as to Eastern and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court, in a per
curiam opinion, citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), affirmed
the judgment against the United States, 350 U.S. 907 (1955), but reversed as to Eastern,
350 U.S. 907, (1955). On rehearing in the Eastern case, the Supreme Court modified its
prior opinion and remanded the case to the court of appeals to pass upon several undecided
issues. The judgment against Eastern was subsequently affirmed. Eastern Air Lines v.
Union Trust Co., 239 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 942 (1957).
33. 221 F.2d at 74.
34. Id.
35. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
36. 221 F.2d at 78.
37. Id. at 77.
1968]
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Having rejected the defenses, the court of appeals, without reference
to any manual or regulation, found the controller negligent.
It is therefore our opinion that, if a Government towerman negligently clears two
planes to land on the same runway at the same time, or is guilty of some other
negligent act or omission in doing his work, the Government is liable for resulting
injury in the same manner and for the same reason that it is liable for injury done
by the driver of a mail truck who, in exercising discretion as to how to drive, negli-
gently runs through a red traffic light.38
In a short per curiam opinion, citing Indian Towing v. United States,"' the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed as to the government. ' "
The Government rarely asserts either the discretionary function 0 de-
fense or private party analogy4" since the Union Trust case which con-
clusively rejected both and enunciated the principle that once the
Government decided to operate a control tower, its employees were re-
quired to act in a reasonable and careful manner and the United States
would be liable for their failure to do so.
More recently, the Government has relied on the "execution of a
regulation" and "misrepresentation" exceptions in ATC cases.42 The
Government claims that when the FAA promulgates an operating manual
to govern controllers' actions and offers testimony concerning the con-
struction of that manual its interpretation is binding on the court. If the
controller fails to follow the manual provision, then the defense is in-
applicable.4 3 However, the defense should be rejected on other grounds
as well. The FAA manual is not a "regulation" within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act.44 To adopt the agency's approach would
permit a governmental agency, such as the FAA, acting without the pro-
38. Id. at 78.
39. 350 U.S. 61 (1961). Indian Towing involved an action for damages caused by the
negligence of the Coast Guard in failing to properly maintain a lighthouse light, thus causing
a tug to crash. The Court held that since the Government had decided to operate the light
and having "engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it [the Government]
was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order"
and to discover and repair any outages or give warning of the outage to users of the water-
ways. Id. at 69.
39a. 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
40. The Government asserted the discretionary function defense in Ingham v. United
States, 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967), and United Air Lines v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), sub nom. United Air
Lines, Inc. v. United States.
41. The private party analogy was asserted in Air Trans. Associates, Inc. v. United States,
221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a) & (h) (1964).
43. 373 F.2d at 227.
44. 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1964).
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tection of the Administrative Procedure Act to promulgate operating
manuals for its personnel, cloak the manuals with the force of law,
and then interpret them at some time subsequent to adoption in com-
plete disregard of the manual's plain language and of the reliance and
understanding which airlines, pilots and the public place upon the manual
provisions.
More serious was the Government's reliance on the misrepresentation
exception. The defense was raised in United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 4 the
leading case arising out of a mid-air crash over Las Vegas. The Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the defense stating that "the gravamen of the action is not
misrepresentation but the negligent performance of operational tasks, al-
though such negligence consisted partly of a failure of a duty to warn.'
In Ingham the Government asserted this defense on appeal and raised it
as the major ground in its unsuccessful petition for certiorari.4 7 Ingham
was a favorable factual situation for raising the misrepresentation de-
fense since it involved inaccurate reporting of known weather information
reflecting substantially deteriorating conditions and the failure to report
known weather information. The Government, relying on flood control"
and Veterans Administration malpractice49 cases, claimed that the essence
of the controller's negligence involved an inaccurate communication or a
failure to communicate known weather information and that this was a
negligent misrepresentation for which it could not be liable. If this de-
fense was upheld, it would bar suits against the Government in any
air traffic control case where the controller provided inaccurate in-
formation or failed to provide information available to him. It would not
be limited to weather reporting but could extend to reporting the position
45. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964). The plaintiffs claimed that the controllers who
cleared the commercial airliner had a duty to provide information necessary for a safe
flight, and they cleared the plane without advising it of a hazardous Air Force flight train-
ing procedure.
46. Id. at 398. Similarly in Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964)
the court stated: "A failure to warn of an existing danger, when a duty to do so exists, is
in a sense an implicit assertion that there is no danger. For some purposes, at least, this
may be properly characterized as a misrepresentation. This is not the type of misrepresenta-
tion, however, that § 2680(h) was intended to cover. This is made clear by the comments in
United States v. Neustadt, 366 US. 696, 711, n.26, 81 S. CL 1294 . . . § 2690(h) does not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction." Id. at 505 (complaint dismissed on other grounds).
47. 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
48. National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954) and Clark v. United
States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954); Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La.
1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964).
49. Beech v. United States, 345 F2d 872 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Hungerford v. United States,
307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
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of other aircraft, failing to report the outage of navigational aids and
various other readily conceivable factual situations. Moreover, if success-
ful, the defense would have an impact in a myriad of situations extending
far beyond air traffic control cases. The court recognized this and stated
that "the government's reading of the misrepresentation exception is
much too broad, for it would exempt from tort liability any operational
malfunction by the government that involved communications in any
form."5 The court rejected the misrepresentation defence and found the
controller's operational negligence analogous to Indian Towing.
The Coast Guard's negligent failure to maintain the beacon lamp in the lighthouse
is closely akin to the controller's failure to provide up-to-date weather conditions.
Both cases thus involved a negligent failure on the part of government employees to
perform a duty they had undertaken-to provide information and warnings to trav-
ellers of the waterways in one case and airways in the other. And in both cases, the
breach of this duty resulted in injuries and deaths. 51
The Government's efforts to assert immunity in traffic control cases
have to date been futile. There is no reason to expect any change in
judicial attitude in the future. Thus, the threshold issue has been resolved
and no suit has been barred by any FTCA defense. Where the Govern-
ment has been successful in avoiding liability it has been due to the
plaintiff's failure to establish actionable negligence.
IV. THE EARLY RULE-ESTRICTED RESPONSIBILITY
The early traffic control cases established a rule of limited controller
responsibility and seldom imposed liability on the United States. The
plaintiff had the burden of establishing that the controller negligently
breached a duty owed to the plaintiff, that the breach proximately caused
the accident, and that the plaintiff was free of contributory negligence."
Plaintiffs were generally successful where the tower operator was provid-
ing direction or control to an aircraft operating in restricted visibility
conditions and the plaintiff was not flying the plane."a Two reasons ex-
50. 373 F.2d at 239.
51. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964) provides that the Government's liability is determined
"in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Depending
upon local law, in death cases, defendant may have the burden of proving that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent in order to defeat the claim.
53. In Union Trust v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953), the controller
cleared two planes to land on the same runway at the same time. In Air Transport Asso-
dates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955), the tower cleared a commercial liner
to land on a runway where an unlighted truck was parked. In Marino v. United States, 84
F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), where the controller cleared an aircraft to a particular
taxiway and it struck a tractor operator who was repairing the runway, the court found that
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plained plaintiffs' failures even where they successfully proved that the
controllers' negligence was the proximate cause of the crash. The most
obvious reason to deny recovery was if plaintiff was contributorily neg-
ligent. Thus, recovery was denied where a pilot blindly descended into a
truck;-4 where he flew below authorized flight minimum;55 where he
failed to observe a converging plane; 6 where the pilot who should have
been aware of wake turbulence requested an intersection (or mid-run-
way) take off.57 Contributory negligence must be determined by a factual
analysis in each case.
Second, and most significant, have been cases where courts have found
that the controller had no duty to act or had a minimal duty vis-?t-vis the
pilot. Thus, courts have found that the controller had no duty to ascertain
the type of license before issuing a clearance,as or to warn a pilot of wake
turbulence before the dangers of wake turbulence were generally recog-
nized;5 9 and they have found that he has only a minimal duty compared
to the pilot's, even when the controller's clearance results in a mid-air
collision. ° In those cases, the courts have reasoned that the clearance
was permissive, not mandatory, and the pilot remained directly respon-
sible for the safety of the aircraft and its occupants."' It is this issue, the
scope of the controller's duties vis-h-vis the pilot, which has undergone
pronounced expansion. This is apparent by reviewing the three major
types of air traffic control cases: mid-air collisions and near misses, wake
turbulence and weather reporting.
V. MID-AiR COLLISION AND NEAR MISSES
The Government is a potential defendant where injuries or death re-
sults from a mid-air collision or evasive action taken to avoid a collision.
the tower had a duty to the repairman to exercise reasonable care and to warn him of
approaching aircraft, particularly where the controller had directed the aircraft to that
runway. Liability was imposed in one unusual case where the controller provided rescue
planes with inaccurate information concerning the crashed plane's location. Blumenthal v.
United States, 189 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962).
54. New York Airways, Inc. v. United States, 283 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1960).
55. Johnson v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960).
56. United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); Stanley v. United States, 239
F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D.C. Del.
1964).
57. Hartz v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 119 (ND. Ga. 1965).
58. Martens v. United States, 5 Av. Cas. 17465 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
59. Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844 (1965).
60. United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Schultetus,
277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960).
61. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1967).
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The Civil Air Regulations, and now the Federal Air Regulations impose
a duty on the Government "to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious
flow of air traffic" and to control aircraft in flight "for the purpose of pre-
venting collision between known aircraft . *. .. "" However, the Govern-
ment was rarely liable where the plaintiff was in operational control of
one of the aircraft involved and was rarely absolved of responsibility
where the plaintiff was an innocent passenger. The courts have imposed
a concurrent duty on both pilot and controller to avoid collisions and
thus, to foster aviation safety. They have been judged by the applicable
standard of due care which prevails in the jurisdiction. In addition, the
controllers have been required to meet the FAA's standards as set forth
in the various operating manuals.
In the Union Trust"5 case, the controller cleared two planes to land on
the same runway at the same time and failed to warn either of the hazard
represented by the other plane. In a suit by passengers, the court found
this conduct improper and determined that the controller failed to exer-
cise reasonable care without reference to any manual or regulation.
However, following Union Trust, the Government was absolved of re-
sponsibility in three suits by pilots of planes involved in mid-air crashes."4
The three cases all involved contributory negligence by the plaintiffs and
an obvious judicial reluctance to impose a duty on the controller when
the pilots were operating in good weather and had the capability of
avoiding the accident. In United States v. Schultetus5 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the trial court overlooked "the principle that the direct
and primary responsibility for the operation of the aircraft over or in
the vicinity of an airport rests upon the pilots of aircraft."0 The
court found that the "clearance" issued by the controller was an au-
thorization to land, permissive in character, which did not relieve the
pilots of their duty to avoid collisions with other planes and that by is-
suing a warning to one of the planes, the controller completely fulfilled
his duty as set forth in the FAA Manual. In United States v. Miller"1
the court stressed that the optimum of safety is achieved when concur-
62. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1967). (Definitions of "Air traffic control" and "Air traffic
clearance").
63. 221 F.2d 62 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
64. United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Schultetus,
277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); Stanley v. United States, 239
F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
65. 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960).
66. Id. at 328.
67. 303 F. 2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
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rent duties are imposed on pilots and tower operations. 8 It rejected the
asserted liability on the ground that even if the controller was negli-
gent, it failed to relieve the pilot of his "direct responsibility" for the
safety of his aircraft. In Stanley v. United States9 the controller, un-
aware that plaintiff's plane was in the vicinity since he had not seen it
or been notified of its presence by plaintiff who was operating under
visual flight rules conditions, cleared a flight of military jets for a low
pass over the field which resulted in the crash. Although plaintiff's claim
failed because he failed to show that the controller knew or should have
known of plaintiff's plane being in the area, the court stressed the pilot's
responsibility for his own safety under the applicable Civil Air Regu-
lations. After reviewing the regulations, it determined that the controller's
function was:
to aid. . . pilots to avoid collisions by issuing traffic clearances or other information
based on known or observed aircraft in the area which, in the traffic controller's
judgment, constitute a potential hazard to the operation of the aircraft concerned. 70
However, in four other cases involving mid-air collisions and injuries
caused by near misses, including one on behalf of a deceased pilot of one
of the planes involved, the Government was held jointly liable. In Cat-
taro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,71 both the Government and the carrier
were held responsible to an injured passenger when a commercial airliner
took sudden evasive action to avoid being struck by a military jet. The
planes were being controlled by different sectors within an FAA air
route traffic control center (ARTCC) .72 Because of a failure of coordina-
tion within the control center, the controller handling the commercial
airliner was not informed of the jet's clearance limit and authorized the
68. The court recognized that: "with increasing density of traffic, increasing speed,
and increasingly complex aircraft which require more attention inside the cockpit, safe
operation is facilitated by providing assistance from ground personnel. Such assistance is
provided by the towers." Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
69. 239 F. Supp. 973 (ND. Ohio 1965).
70. Id. at 978.
71. 236 F. Supp. 889 (ED. Va. 1964).
72. The FAA operates 30 air route traffic control centers, commonly referred to as
centers, throughout the United States. The centers provide air traffic services for aircraft
operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) during the en route portion of a flight. Each
center is divided into numerous sectors with responsibility for a particular geographic area
within the geographic area of the center's control. As an aircraft flies throughout the
country air traffic control responsibility will pass or be "handed off" from the airport's de-
parture controller to the center, and from sector to sector within the center. The plane %%ill
be handed off from center to center until it enters the terminal area. Control i.il then be




collision course. Without referring to any operating manual the court
stated: "A Government air traffic controller cannot authorize an airplane
to fly a collision course with another airplane then being monitored by
another Government controller and escape liability by claiming neither
controller had a duty to separate them." 3 The statement seems obvious.
However, in view of the Government's claim, the court felt compelled to
articulate this basic premise. One of the grounds for holding the Govern-
ment liable in the cases arising out of the Las Vegas mid-air collision
between a military jet and a commercial airliner was the controller's
failure to warn the commercial airliner of a military jet flight practice
procedure.74 The airliner was operating under instrument flight rules
which meant that it continuously reported its progress to the FAA con-
trol center and expected the controller to provide instructions and clear-
ances which, at a minimum, would prevent collision with other aircraft.
The court pointed out that while an IFR clearance did not "insure"
positive separation from all aircraft, it did impose an obligation on the
controllers to warn of known hazards and to assist pilots "by providing
such advice and information as may be useful for the safe and efficient
conduct of a flight. 17 5 Courts have relied on the controller's own manual
as a basis for finding a duty to warn and to aid pilots operating in an
airport area in visual flight rule conditions. In Hochrein v. United States,"
the court said the controller had not completely fulfilled his duty when
he took no further action after warning one of two planes of the possi-
bility of a collision. Unlike Schultetus and Miller, the court stated that
more was required when the controller's warning signal was disregarded.
The court stated that "[t]he continuing failure to so inform Hochrein of
the existence of a possible danger, in the form of an unseeing aircraft,
was a continuing breach of duty owing to Hochrein . ." and that this
breach contributed to the crash.77
The last reported case involving a mid-air collision arose from the
crash between a commercial liner and an Air National Guard jet.'8 The
73. 236 F. Supp. at 895.
74. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951
(1964).
75. 335 F.2d at 397, citing 14 C.F.R. § 617.4, setting forth relevant air traffic control rules.
76. 238 F. Supp. 317 (ED. Pa. 1965).
77. Id. at 320.
78. Maryland ex rel. Meyer v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 768 (D.D.C. 1966). Plaintiffs
originally contended that the National Guard pilot was acting in the course of employment
for the United States. The issue was tried separately and it was ruled that the United States
was liable for the pilot's negligence. At trial, the pilot of the jet was found negligent and the
commercial aircraft absolved of responsibility. This was affirmed in 322 F.2d 1009 (D.C.
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court recognized the pilot's obligation to use a high degree of care but
stressed that the pilot and controller had a concurrent duty. The court
found the controller's "instant inattention" was the difference "between
safety and disaster" and that his failure to see what was on the radar-
scope and immediately issue a warning was a proximate cause of the
crash.79 It stated that the center controllers have a duty to use diligence to
observe and detect on the radarscope any traffic flying on visual flight
rules and other obstructions in the vicinity of the aircraft that is being
controlled and immediately to warn the pilot of any impending danger.
While this duty is not absolute and does not mean that the Government
is an insurer of safety, nevertheless, due care must be exercised to dis-
charge it adequately. "What constitutes due care under any circumstances
necessarily depends in large part on the risk and hazard involved."'  The
Government has also contributed a portion of the total amount in settle-
ment of other cases arising out of mid-air collisions. It was a co-defendant
with the two airlines in cases arising out of the mid-air collision over
Brooklyn, New York and paid approximately three million dollars toward
the settlement. According to FAA Administrator Najeeb Halaby, "The
Department of Justice, after carefully looking over the case said that
the litigation risk of the judge . . . holding the government culpable
indicated we had better settle .. ..,,1
The Government will undoubtedly find itself a co-defendant and share
responsibility in most mid-air collision cases.8 2 The increased hazards of
flight resulting from more planes placing increased reliance on radar
control and assistance will result in the court's imposing a higher stan-
dard upon both the government and the aircraft operator. Apportioning
responsibility based on who has "primary" or "direct" responsibility is
Cir. 1963). Subsequently, the Third Circuit came to a contrary conclusion on the respondeat
superior issue in Levin v. United States, 329 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
affirmed Levin, 382 U.S. 158 (1965), thus holding that the pilot was not a U.S. employee but
also remanded the cases for disposition of the unresolved issue-whether the Washington
Center controllers handling the Viscount should have observed the jet and warned the pilot
of the danger. Trial on the issue of controller negligence was conducted and the court
found the controller negligent 257 F. Supp. 768. The Government filed a notice of appeal but
settled the cases while the appeal was pending.
79. 257 F. Supp. at 774. "Failure to see and realize what was visible and discernible
[on the radar scope], followed by failure to give immediate warning, constituted negligence
that was one of the proximate causes of the accident." Id.
80. Id. at 772.
81. Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations. H.R. 88th Cong.
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1155 (1964).




a sterile, semantic exercise which does nothing to further aviation safety.
The better approach, and certainly the safer one, is to impose upon both
the pilot and the controller a realistic standard of concurrent responsibil-
ity for the safety of all aircraft.
VI. WAKE TURBULENCE CASES
Wake turbulence constitutes an invisible, but dangerous hazard to
aircraft operations. Its dangers were not fully appreciated until a few
years ago.83 The cases against the Government have been prosecuted on
the theory that the controller has a duty to warn of the danger and assure
adequate separation between aircraft. With one exception they have not
been successful because of a failure to establish the cause of the crash
or because of the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. But even in this
difficult area the courts have shown an increasing recognition of the vital
role the controller can and should play in warning pilots, particularly
inexperienced pilots, of the invisible hazard of wake turbulence.
Plaintiffs' claims have been rejected in three of the four reported cases.
In one case, the plaintiff failed to establish that the controller knew of
the phenomenon and the court rightly reasoned that there could be no
duty without knowledge.8" However, implicit in the court's reasoning
was the understanding that with knowledge of the wake turbulence
phenomena a duty would probably be imposed on the controller. In a
second case, the court stated that the controller did have a duty to con-
sider and warn the pilot of turbulence. 80 The court, relying on the CAR
requirement that controllers assist pilots by "providing such advice and
information as may be useful for the safe . . . conduct of a flight,"
8
ruled that even though the FAA had not promulgated separation stan-
dards based on turbulence, the controllers "in the exercise of reasonable
care, do have a duty to take into consideration turbulence hazards when
giving clearance to land.""7
The controller's duties were re-examined in two recent cases which
83. When a plane moves through the air its wings and engines (and the rotors in a
helicopter) create turbulent forces which flow behind the aircraft and gradually dissipate
with time and distance. It is particularly hazardous for small planes which, operating at
close to their stall speeds, pass in close proximity to larger planes while attempting to land
or take off.
84. Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844 (1965).
85. Johnson v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 509
(6th Cir. 1961).
86. 14 C.F.R. § 617.4 (1967) (as in effect on the date of the accident).
87. 183 F. Supp. at 493.
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reached diametrically opposite results. In Hartz v. United States8 the
court rejected plaintiff's claim because of plaintiff's own contributory
negligence. However, the court went on to reject plaintiff's assertion that
there was a common law duty of due care applicable to the controller,
finding instead that the controller's duty was fixed by the FAA operating
manuals, which he had complied with. Unfortunately, the court became
mired in an unnecessary and confusing discussion of whether the pilot
or the controller had the "primary" or "main" responsibility for the safe
conduct of the flight. There is no question that the CAR's (now the
FAR's) give the pilot the authority to refuse to land or take off even
after he receives a clearance from the controller. While the pilot retains
the ultimate authority for the safety of his aircraft, it does not mean
that the controller is not also under duty to act where safety requires. The
court's opinion suggests a very restricted scope of duty, limited to the
literal language of the controller's operating manual and easily super-
ceded by any negligence by the pilot.
The result and the approach adopted in Furumizo v. United States"0
was diametrically contrary to Hartz. In Furumizo, the district court stated
that the controller "had a duty to exercise judgment to attempt to avoid
danger where such danger was, or should have been, obviously imminent,"
and that a "mere" warning of turbulence was not enough where the con-
troller should have realized that the pilot was commencing an "extremely
hazardous or suicidal" take off attempt." The court rejected the Govern-
ment's claim that "traffic regulations" was the only standard applicable
to the controller's conduct. It stated that the Federal Aviation Act im-
posed a duty on the FAA to provide for aircraft safety"' and that the
controller's own manuals "equally stress the safety and protection of
aircraft."92 The court stressed the concept of concurrent responsibility
and concluded that the controller was not slavishly bound to follow the
book but was expected to exercise judgment and had the authority, even
under his own manuals, to lengthen the separation between aircraft
if "the danger of air turbulence appeared imminent.""3 The Ninth Circuit
88. 249 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
89. 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii, 1965), aff'd, 381 F2d 965 (1967).
90. Id. at 992.
91. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(b) (1964).
92. 245 F. Supp. at 993 (emphasis omitted).
93. Id. at 992. "However, this Court finds that the regulations and directives did
not leave the tower controllers devoid of any duty to exercise judgment in the interests
of safety where, in a situation like this, they knew, or should have known, that a light Piper
taking off at the time and in the manner and under the cicumstances of this particular case
must almost certainly encounter air turbulence of a degree so severe as to be imminently
1968]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
unanimously affirmed and ruled that the controller had a duty to reissue
his warning when he realized that his original warning was being ignored.
The court rejected the Government's contention that having cleared the
plane and given a warning, the controller's obligation ended-a view
directly opposite to that expressed in Hartz. The court stated:
The government maintains that giving this type of clearance transferred to the pilot
of the Piper, or left with him, the sole responsibility for avoiding the danger. No
doubt, he had that responsibility. United States v. Miller, supra. And it may be (we
do not decide) that if, after giving the warning, the attention of the controllers had
been diverted elsewhere, either by their duties or even fortuitously, so that they did
not see the Piper start its takeoff in disregard of the warning, the United States
would not be liable. But we are unwilling to hold, as the government would have us
do, that when the controllers did see the Piper start its takeoff, they had no
duty to act. The danger was extreme, and they knew it. Nothing in the regulations
or manual says that, under such circumstances, controllers shall not act. As the trial
judge points out ...the regulations and manual do not make mere automata of the
controllers. Their job requires that they act in the interest of safety, and it would
be strange indeed if that overriding duty did not include an obligation to seek, by
appropriate instructions, to warn a pilot who is starting to take off when it is apparent
to them that he will encounter a severe hazard. 94
The court was not required to and did not rule whether the controller had
the authority to deny or delay granting a clearance.
The cases show, with the exception of Hartz, an emerging concept of
responsibility in wake turbulence cases. The controller has a duty to
consider wake turbulence when granting clearances, to issue warnings
when turbulence may be a factor and to continue to reissue the warn-
ings if it appears that the pilot has not fully appreciated the hazards. It
is still an open question whether the controller may, in the exercise of
reasonable care, deny or delay a clearance. Airlines and pilot groups have
urged that the controllers be prohibited from denying or delaying a pilot's
request for a take-off or landing clearance. The FAA has acceded to this
view believing that it means less of a burden on the controller and that
it will insulate the FAA from responsibility. It has formulated its operat-
ing manuals so as to deny this power to its controllers except where
necessary to avoid collision. This shortsighted and self-interested ap-
proach by the agency primarily charged with fostering aviation safety
dangerous to the occupant or occupants of the light plane, which might well include an
unskilled student pilot whose life depends upon the exercise of due care by both his In-
structor pilot and the tower control operator. That these regulations did contemplate,
permit and authorize the exercise of discretion and judgment on the part of tower control
operators to lengthen separation if the danger of air turbulence appeared Imminent Is
proved by the acts and publications of the F.A.A ... " Id. at 1002-03 (emphasis omitted).
94. 381 F.2d at 968.
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denies the pilot and the public the benefit of the controller's professional
judgment solely for the purpose of avoiding potential liability and cater-
ing to one segment of the aviation community. The approach is unsound,
unsafe, unresponsive to the public's need and unlikely to meet with
approval. In an appropriate case, involving a passenger rather than a
pilot, the reasoning and logic of the district court in Furunizo will prob-
ably be adopted and the controller will be required to exercise his pro-
fessional judgment in the further interest of aviation safety.
VII. WEATHER REPORTING CASES
Accurate and up-to-date weather information is vital to aviation safety.
Reported and forecast weather effects flight operations and may even
determine whether a take off or landing may be attempted. Particularly
in marginal visibility conditions, accurate weather information is critical
to safe aircraft operations. Courts have imposed a duty upon controllers
to report accurate, complete and current weather information. Recently,
one district court has gone so far as to hold that the controller should
deny a take off clearance where he knows that existing weather conditions
make take off hazardous.
The Federal Aviation Act requires the Weather Bureau to make ob-
servations, furnish reports to the FAA and to assist in the dissemination
of weather reports "[iln order to promote safety and efficiency in air
navigation to the highest possible degree."9 The Weather Bureau and
the FAA have jointly developed an extensive system to obtain current
weather information and to disseminate it to the ultimate users, the pilots.
The Weather Bureau has observing stations at many locations including
most major airports and the observations of its trained meteorologists are
disseminated nationally via an extensive communications network.
The first issue faced in weather reporting cases was whether the con-
troller could deny a request for a clearance solely because of adverse
weather. The Government's position has consistently been that even
where the reported weather is below operating minimums the controller
is required to issue a clearance, if requested, but should explicitly notify
the pilot of the below minimum conditions and report the flight operation
as a violation for subsequent disciplinary proceedings, if the pilot chooses
to proceed with the below minimum operation.
The Government's position was adopted in the first weather reporting
case. In Sinerdon v. United States90 the plaintiff unsuccessfully contended
95. 49 U.S.C. § 1463 (1964).
96. 135 F. Supp. 929 (D. Mass. 1955). The controller was located in a darkened radar
room, and had no personal knowledge of weather conditions. He learned through weather
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that the controller had a duty to determine whether the weather condi-
tion was safe for a landing, and to deny a clearance if visibility was
"unsafe." The court adopted the narrow view that the CAR's limited the
controller's responsibility to collision avoidance and that the plane was
properly controlled "insofar as its safety from collision was concerned."
The court pointed out that the controller reported the weather accurately
and assisted the pilot following the pilot's decision to make the approach.
The court noted that the regulations did not go as far as plaintiff urged. It
stated that: "These regulations [the CAR's] do not place upon Air
Traffic Control Operators the responsibility of determining whether or
not a given weather condition is safe for a landing." 7
However, in Stark v. United States0 8 the court ruled that the controller
did have a duty to determine if weather conditions permitted a safe flight.
In Stark, a request for a take off clearance was granted even though the
visibility had fallen to zero and the crew had not been advised of this
deterioration. The plane crashed on take off due to the pilot's inability
to maintain his bearing. The court stated that the controller should
have advised the pilot of the decrease in visibility but, since the pilot
could see as well as the controller, that failure was not the proximate
cause of the crash. The court rested its decision on the fact that the con-
troller knowingly violated the Civil Air Regulations by issuing the clear-
ance knowing that the weather was below minimums. The court ruled
that the controller had the power and duty to deny a clearance both under
the CAR's and under prevailing "custom and practice." 99 Thus, Stark is
directly contrary to Smerdon on the issue of whether the controller has
the authority and the duty to deny a clearance in dangerous weather
conditions.
Both Stark, Smerdon and every other reported case recognize a duty
to report accurate, complete and current weather.00 The leading case on
reports that visibility at Logan Airport was below VFR minimums and extremely poor.
The controller broadcast the appropriate weather information and also weather reports for
a nearby airport which was above minimums. The pilot erroneously believed this to be the
Logan Airport weather, reported seeing the end of the runway and requested a VFR
clearance, which the controller granted. While on approach, the plane encountered restricted
visibility, crashed short of the runway and the passenger died.
97. Id. at 932.
98. - F. Supp. - (S.D. Cal. 1967).
99. Major General Joseph Caldera, President of the nonprofit advisory Flight Safety
Foundation, recently proposed that weather specialists be given authority to deny the right
to take off to non-instrument rated pilots in potentially bad weather. The proposal was
criticized by many groups representing private pilots. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1967, at 50, col. 2.
100. One of the earliest traffic control cases imposed liability on the Government partly
because the controller failed to advise the pilot of a thunderstorm and the pilot entered the
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the issue of whether reporting is Ingiam v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc."' hold-
ing the Government liable for the controller's failure to accurately dis-
seminate available visibility information to an aircraft making a final
landing approach in marginal weather conditions. The controller had been
notified that visibility had deteriorated substantially, but was still above
the aircraft's landing minimum. He not only failed to report it to the
approaching plane, but misled the crew by restating the superseded visi-
bility. The court rejected as "inordinately narrow" the Government's
claim that its manual required the controller to report visibility on initial
contact and thereafter only if visibility fell below weather minimums.1 12
It found that the Government had accepted a duty to report necessary
weather changes and that the "more meaningful and reasonable inter-
pretation" of the Government's manual:
required the approach controller to report those subsequent changes which, under
all the circumstances, the crew would have considered important both in determining
whether to attempt a landing, and in preparing for the weather conditions most likely
to be encountered near the runway. In our view, a drop in visibility of 25%, from
one mile to three-quarters of a mile, bringing existing weather conditions dangerously
close to landing minimums, is such a critical change that, in the interests of safety,
it should have been reported to the crew of EAL 512.103
The court noted that the carriers place a "heavy degree of reliance" on
the controllers and have reduced their efforts to inform their crews of
weather changes. The court also rejected the Government's claim that
since the initial decision to provide weather information was a gratuitous
one, it could proceed "with impunity to violate its own regulations and
act in a negligent manner."'10 It stated that, like the good samaritan, once
storm unprepared. Bright v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 620 (ED. Ill. 1956). See also
DeVere v. True-Flight, Inc., 10 Av. Cas. 17239 (E.D. N.C. 1967), where the Government
provided the pilot with the latest weather information available.
101. 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
102. Id. at 235. Air Traffic Control Procedures Manual, ATP 7110.1A § 265.2. At trial
plaintiff claimed other violations of FAA manuals and of the duty of due care. It asserted
that surface visibility, sky cover information and quandrantal visibility, which also showed
deteriorating conditions, should have been reported and that the Runway Visual Range
(RVR), an electronic visibility measuring device, which showed visibility to be below
landing minimums should have been used. Plaintiff also contended that the Weather Bureau
and FAA incorrectly determined that the visibility observed by the tower controller rather
than that observed by the Weather Bureau observer "controlled" aircraft operations. These
claims included violations of other provisions of the Air Traffic Control Manual, the Com-
munications Manual, ATP 7300.1, the Facility Operation Manual, ATP 7230.1 and the
Weather Bureau's Manual of Surface Observations, Circular "N." Both the district court and
the court of appeals rejected the claim concerning the RVR and did not pass on the other
issues raised by the plaintiff.
103. 373 F.2d at 235.
104. Id. at 236.
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the Government undertakes to act it will be liable if the activities are
negligently performed.'0 5
The court found the violation of FAA operating manuals sufficient
basis for the finding of negligence and did not discuss the controller's
common law duties. The court also rejected the Government's contention
that its failure to report the visibility change was not a proximate cause
of the crash."0 6 The court recognized that the final decision to land or
not must properly rest in the pilot's hands since he is in the best position
to observe the weather and judge its effect on the landing attempt.
However,
[i]f the pilot does decide to attempt a landing, information concerning recent and
significant changes in weather conditions is essential to his mental computations and
the exercise of his judgment .... Thus, it was of the utmost importance that the
crew not be lulled into a false sense of security. The pilot should have been told
that weather conditions were becoming marginal, and that he might well encounter
less than minimum visibility upon reaching the runway.'0 7
The court's approach to the weather reporting problem is a balanced
and reasonable one. It recognizes the pilot's responsibility for the safety
of his plane while at the same time recognizing his need for accurate
information for advance planning and intelligent decision making. Re-
quiring air traffic to provide complete, accurate and up-to-date weather
information may impose a minimal additional burden on the controller.
However, this is a small price to pay if the information averts even a
single accident. The reliance of the public and the carrier on air traffic
controllers are factors which no longer can be ignored. The imposition of
concurrent responsibilities on both controller and pilot provides maximum
safety.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The early air traffic control cases enunciated a restricted rule of
liability for air traffic control activities. The restricted rule accurately
reflected the extent of the controller's duties vis-h-vis the pilot. However,
since aviation has developed dynamically in the past decade, the division
of responsibility has changed and the legal rules are in the process of
adapting themselves to the developments which have taken place in avia-
tion operations.
In the early days, the pilot bore almost the sole responsibility for the
105. Id.
106. The Government claimed, as it did successfully in Stark, that the pilot had the most
accurate and up-to-date knowledge of the weather on the runway since he was there and the
control tower observer was more than one and one-half miles from the runway threshold.
107. 373 F.2d at 237.
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safety of his aircraft. The air traffic control facilities were limited. The
courts spoke in terms of the pilot having a "direct" or "primary" respon-
sibility for the safety of his aircraft. As aviation changed the responsibil-
ities of the controllers increased and pilots relied on controllers to a
greater extent for advice, information and in certain circumstances for
guidance and direction. As more air traffic control cases were tried, courts
acquired a better understanding of the controllers' duties and his role
vis-h-vis the pilot. More and more, the courts recognized that aviation
safety was fostered by imposing concurrent duties on both pilot and
controller.
The courts have tended to increase the affirmative duties of the con-
troller in each of three major areas of air traffic responsibility in ac-
cordance with the expanded scope of his operation responsibilities. The
Government's efforts to circumscribe the area of the controller's duties
by restrictive operating manuals have been rejected. The courts have
asserted that the controller must satisfy not only the Government manual
requirements but also the accepted standard of due care prevailing in
the jurisdiction. They have stressed his duty to aid and assist pilots and
they expect the controller to exercise his professional judgment, rather
than blindly follow a limited and limiting standard which fails to con-
sider the needs of safety as its prime criteria.
While this approach may cause some uncertainty on the controller's
part concerning the extent of his responsibility and may impose an addi-
tional burden on him, it more accurately reflects the relative role of the
controller and the pilot and the public's understanding and reliance on
the Government's participation in aviation operations. The full extent of
the controller's responsibilities has not been definitely established. How-
ever, the broad outline seems clear. There is an affirmative duty to assure
separation between aircraft and prevent mid-air collisions. This is the
major reason for the existence of the entire air traffic control system. At
a minimum this duty extends to all aircraft operating under positive
control. It also applies to cases where the danger of the collision was or
should have been obvious to the controller. As the turbulence, weather
and collision cases demonstrate the controller must provide pilots with
accurate and up to date information which may affect flight safety. The
controller must assure that the pilot receives all relevant information
he needs to make an intelligent judgment concerning the course of his
flight.
The controller will be required to warn pilots of imminent dangers,
whether the hazard involves turbulence, weather conditions or possible
collisions. Where the danger is imminent and the pilot demonstrates no
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awareness of the hazard, a mere perfunctory warning will not be sufficient
to discharge the controller's responsibility to warn. At a minimum, the
controller will be required to exercise his professional judgment and dis-
cretion to issue the appropriate warnings. The controller will not be
permitted to evade responsibility where he could have acted to prevent
the accident. Some courts and some members of the aviation community
believe that controllers should be authorized and required to deny clear-
ances and pilot requests if the controller believes the requested course
of action is hazardous. They argue that this will free the controller to
exercise his professional judgment and act as a check on reckless pilot
conduct. However, most pilots, air carriers and FAA officials oppose this
approach and with the exception of one case, it has not been adopted.
Without a change in the appropriate regulations and manuals it is not.
likely that the courts will impose this type of duty on the controllers.
The extent of the controller's responsibility has not been definitely
established. However, it is clear that the judicial attitude of fostering
aviation safety has led the courts to impose a concurrent responsibility
on pilots and controllers.
